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THE ROLE OF THE RELIGIOUS LEADER IN
THE DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC POLICY
INTRODUCTION

In 1982, DePaul University announced the establishment of the Center
for Church/State Studies. Situated in its College of Law, the DePaul Center
for Church/State Studies is the only legal research institute in the nation
focused sharply on the study of religion and government. The Center is
dedicated exclusively to scholarship and therefore does not advocate either
partisan political or sectarian religious positions. The Dean of the College
of Law has appointed eighteen distinguished legal scholars and practicing
attorneys from a wide variety of religious traditions to the Center's executive
board.
Early in 1983, well before the presidential campaign began to develop
largely around the issue of religion and politics, the Center's executive board
decided to look carefully at the issue by sponsoring a symposium on the
role of the religious leader in the development of public policy. While there
was a great deal of political rhetoric on the pages of the nation's daily
newspapers and weekly news magazines, very little reflective and responsible
commentary on the proper relationship of religion and politics was available
for public consumption. When the American Bar Association heard of the
Center's plans to sponsor a symposium on the role of the religious leader
in the development of public policy, the American Bar Association offered
its annual meeting of over 10,000 lawyers as an appropriate setting for the
symposium.
The Center invited Joseph Cardinal Bernardin, Catholic Archbishop of
Chicago, to present the major paper, "The Role of the Religious Leader
in the Development of Public Policy." Cardinal Bernardin's chairmanship
of the American Catholic Bishop's Committee which prepared a landmark
document on nuclear war, "The Challenge of Speech: God's Promise, Our
Response," provided him with a particularly appropriate perspective from
which to address the more theoretical question at issue in our symposium,
namely, the proper involvement of religious leaders in the national public
policy discussion.
In his major paper, Cardinal Bernardin addresses the moral implications
of public policy. He points out two common misconceptions: "that morality
is limited to private matters" and "that the development of public policy
is a purely secular or political endeavor." He next addresses the role of the
Church in the development of public policy, setting forth his arguments for
the appropriate place of the Church in the public policy discussion, the
appropriate posture that the Church assumes, and the particular perspective
the Church uses to guide its participation in the public debate. Lastly,
Cardinal Bernardin describes the role of the religious leader in the development of public policy underscoring the critical importance of the religious
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leader's personal credibility, personal limitations, commitment to engage in
dialogue on the issues, and personal sense of balance and sensitivity for the
broader perspective.
The first formal response to Cardinal Bernardin was given by Dr. Martin
E. Marty, Fairfax M. Cone Distinguished Service Professor, University of
Chicago Divinity School. Professor Marty is one of the most eminent
historians of religion in America. He has published many books, including
Righteous Empire, A Cry of Absence, and Pilgrims in Their Own Land,
and has received numerous awards, citations, and distinctions. He has taught
in the Divinity School at the University of Chicago for the past twenty-one
years. Professor Marty's task was to set Cardinal Bernardin's paper in its
proper religious historical context.
In his response, Professor Marty reports on what he heard in Cardinal
Bernardin's address "that can be placed on the agenda for further discussion and inquiry." The questions Professor Marty raised for careful consideration before the audience of the American Bar Association were whether
church/state represents a settled area of national life or not, whether religious
leaders and groups have a right to speak up on public issues or not, whether
religious leaders and groups are well-counselled to remain silent and uninvolved,
whether religious leaders should take the risks in an era when persuasion,
not coercion, rules, and whether religious leaders are religious or whether
they lead religious groups.
The second formal response was given by the Honorable Arlin M. Adams,
Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Judge
Adams has distinguished himself as one of the finest scholar-judges in the
country. The particular focus of his scholarship has been the religion clauses
of the first amendment. He has taught a seminar course on the religion clauses
at the University of Pennsylvania Law School for the past fifteen years and
is just finishing a two-volume work on church/state legal issues. Judge
Adams's task at the symposium was to critique Cardinal Bernardin's paper
from the perspective of a constitutional law scholar and an experienced public
policy expert.
In his response, Judge Adams takes a somewhat more restricted view of
the role of the religious leader in the development of public policy than the
one set forth by Cardinal Bernardin. He proceeds from the premise that
the "direct involvement of religious leaders in political affairs should be
limited and infrequent," a premise that is largely based on the religious
leader's primary and inherent concern with transcendence. On the other hand,
prudent and wise religious leaders, in Judge Adams's view, are not limited
to uttering harmless banalities and pious generalizations.
The full texts of Cardinal Bernardin's address as well as the formal
responses of Professor Marty and Judge Adams follow.
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JOSEPH CARDINAL BERNARDIN*

First let me express my gratitude to the American Bar Association for
its kind invitation to address you this afternoon and to the DePaul University Center for Church/State Studies for organizing this showcase presentation. I would like to commend the American Bar Association for bringing
important issues of public concern to the attention of the nation at large.
I would also like to pay tribute to the DePaul Center for Church/State Studies
because of its impressive initial efforts at sustained legal research into ,the
complex relationship between religion and government in American society.
I have been asked to address a topic to which I have devoted considerable
time and reflection during the past year: the role of the religious leader in
the development of public policy. I want you to understand clearly at the
outset that I do not come before you as a politician or a policy expert;
I am a believer and a pastor in the Catholic Church. What I say to you
this afternoon is a reflection and extension of the concern of the teaching
and practice of the Church throughout the world.
I will address my reflections in three steps: (1) the moral implications of
public policy, (2) the Church's role in the development of public policy,
and, in the light of this, (3) the role of the religious leader in public policy
development.
1. The Moral Implications of Public Policy
There are two popular misconceptions that tend to derail discussion about
church participation in public policy development. The first is the mistaken
notion that morality is limited to personal matters. Religious values are not
limited to personal morality and religion. The founding principle of our
society is the dignity and worth of every individual. Religious values include
recognition of the dignity and worth of all people under God and the responsibilities of a social morality that flow from this belief. Catholic social doctrine is based on two truths about the human person: human life is both
sacred and social. Because we esteem human life as sacred, we have a duty
to protect and foster it at all stages of development from conception to death
and in all circumstances. Because we acknowledge that human life is also
social, we must develop the kind of societal environment that protects and
fosters its development.
The second popular misconception is that the development of public policy
is a purely secular or political endeavor, or merely economic or technological
in scope. If this were the case, then the Church and religious leaders would
have no specific role in the development of such policy. However, there are
important moral and religious dimensions to each of the problems facing
the human community, and these dimensions must be taken into consideration in the development of public policy.
Individuals, institutions, and governments frequently make important deci* Archbishop of Chicago.
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sions that affect human lives about such issues as distribution of the earth's
resources, scientific research, and technological application. Increasingly,
voices echoing the concepts of philosophers and the concerns of ordinary
people say that the distinctive mark of human genius is to order every aspect
of contemporary life in light of a moral vision. A moral vision seeks to
direct the resources of politics, economics, science and technology to the
welfare of the human person and the human community.
Let me illustrate this with an example. Perhaps the most significant factor that we have to face in our scientific and technological age is that, for
the first time in human history, we have the power to destroy ourselves and
our world. Forty years ago the German theologian Romano Guardini wrote
that the predominant moral issue of the twentieth century would be whether
we could develop the moral capacity to control the power we have created.
That moral issue still confronts us today with increasing urgency. A directing moral vision is needed to bring the technology of the arms race to its
appropriate subordinate role. Only people, however, possess moral vision.
Our hope for the future is rooted in people who can express such a vision
and in those who are willing to implement it.
For example, the subject of moral purpose and American foreign policy
has been a persistent topic in American history. The content of the debate
has varied, from the idealism of Wilson to the realism of Morganthau, but
the desire to provide moral direction for American policy has been a continuing theme of our national political life. There have always been critics
of the theme. In the 1960's Dean Acheson remarked that there were two
kinds of problems in foreign policy: real problems and moral problems.
However, Mr. Acheson took the subject seriously himself, and, if anything,
the salience of moral argument in the policy debate has increased in recent
years.
The 1970's were marked by the resurgence of interest in human rights
issues, and the 1980's find much of the country involved in a spirited and
serious discussion of morality and nuclear policy.
Both issues-human rights and nuclear policy-illustrate the complexity
of a moral debate about the ends and means of foreign policy. Both issues
highlight, however, that the exclusion of the moral factor from the policy
debate is purchased at a high price not only for our values but also in terms
of our interests. Allow me to argue the case briefly for the necessity and
the possibility of constructing a coherent linkage of moral principles and
policy choices.
The necessity of moral analysis in the policy debate is rooted in the
character of the issues we faced in the last two decades of this century. The
major issues of the day are not purely technical or tactical in nature; they
are fundamental questions in which the moral dimension is a pervasive and
persistent factor. We live in a world which is interdependent in character
and nuclear in context. Interdependence means we are locked together in
a limited world. The factual interdependence of our economies raises key
questions of access to resources for the industrial nations, but also justice
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in the economic system for the developing nations. The nuclear context of
the age brings sharply into focus the problem of keeping the peace in an
interdependent world governed by independent states. To build and preserve
peace in our world, the key moral question is how we relate politics,
economics, and ethics to shape our material interdependence in the direction of moral interdependence.
The Catholic bishops of the United States in their pastoral letter, "The
Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response," spoke of today's
dual challenge: building the peace in an interdependent world and keeping
the peace in the nuclear age. Both tasks exemplify the necessity of shaping
our factual view of the world in terms of the demands of the moral order.
The absence of moral vision can erode both our values and our interests.
The possibility of meeting the moral challenge in our conception of policy
is rooted in two resources of our country and our culture. The first is part
of the constitutional tradition, itself a bearer of moral values including respect
for life and reverence for the law, a commitment to freedom and a desire
to relate it to justice. To ignore the moral dimension of public policy is
to forsake our constitutional heritage.
The second resource is the religiously pluralist character of the nation.
The purpose of the separation of church and state in American society is
not to exclude the voice of religion from public debate, but to provide a
context of religious freedom where the insights of each religious tradition
can be set forth and tested. The very testing of the religious voice opens
the public debate to assessment by moral criteria. To ignore the moral dimension of public policy is also to forsake our religious heritage.
Who should participate in public policy discussions? In the complexity
of our world today, not everything should be left to governments, even
though it ig impossible to ignore the crucial role of the policies of governments and other major social and economic institutions. Developing and
implementing a moral vision for this nation is a task for philosophers and
poets, for scientists and statesmen, for social workers and civil servants, for
laborers and lawyers and judges-in short, for all citizens. Our effective
involvement in building a just and peaceful world will be measured by our
ability to think in terms of a guiding moral vision equal to the challenges
of the world as we know it today.
This is clearly the thinking of Pope John Paul II who has said that: "Peace
cannot be built by the power of rulers alone. Peace can be firmly constructed
only if it corresponds to the resolute determination of all people of good
will. Rulers must be supported and enlightened by a public opinion that
encourages them or, where necessary, expresses disapproval." (World Day
of Peace Message, 1982).
In the perspective of this quotation, public opinion plays both a positive
and a restraining role. At times it should provide support for necessary but
perhaps unpopular initiatives; at other times public opinion should place limits
on the direction of policy.
In our American society, individuals and groups are free to participate
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in any dimension of the public debate. This is one of the hallmarks of
American democracy. However, individuals and groups must also earn the
right to be heard by the quality and consistency of their arguments.
It is clear that public opinion is not always wise and well-formed politically
or ethically. The task of trying to shape a well-formed public opinion, which
both provides positive direction and sets moral limits for power, is central
to the public role of the Church.
2.

The Role of the Church in the Development of Policy

Because certain issues in the public policy debate are not simply political
or economic or technological, but also moral and religious questions, the
Church must be a participant in the process.
The participation of the Catholic bishops in public policy discussion is
rooted in our conviction that moral values and principles relate to public
policy as well as to personal choices. It is also rooted in a belief that we
honor our constitutional tradition of religious freedom precisely by exercising our right to participate in the public life of the nation. Entering the
policy debate as Catholic bishops we make use of a long detailed tradition
of moral analysis and relationships with the universal Church which provide
us with valuable perspectives about the influence of U.S. policy throughout
the world. These policies include not only the foreign policy of our government, but also business and trade agreements and technological application.
To clarify the Church's role in the development of public policy, let me
clarify three basic issues: the place of the Church in the public arena, the
posture the Church assumes, and the perspective we use to guide our participation in the public debate.
Explaining the proper place of the Church in the public arena has most
often been in response to charges that we are violating the separation of
church and state. My experience of the last three and one-half years is that
this precious tenet of our constitutional tradition holds a paradoxical place
in the public mind. There seems to be an inverse relationship between the
readiness of people to invoke the principle and their capacity to understand
it clearly.
The phrase is used most often to tell religious bodies to be quiet. However,
my reading of the constitutional principle-and the theology which affirms
its truth-is that the separation of church and state is designed to provide
religious organizations space to speak! To put it succinctly, the separation
of church and state means that religious communities should expect neither
favoritism nor discrimination in the exercise of their religious and civic functions. They are free to participate in any dimension of the public debate,
but they must earn the right to be heard by the quality of their arguments.
The place of the Church is separate from the state but must never be separate
from society. In society, churches are voluntary associations, free to address
the public agenda of the nation. More specifically, they are voluntary associations with a disciplined capacity to analyze the moral-religious significance
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of public issues. That, at least, is how the Catholic bishops see their place
in the public policy debate.
That is why we assume a posture which is designed to keep our role both
ecclesial and public. The challenge is how to speak as a church to a public
issue; how to speak from a tradition of faith in a language which is open
to public acceptance by citizens of several faiths or no faith. Early in the
pastoral letter on war and peace, the Catholic bishops defined their posture
in this way: "As bishops we believe that the nature of Catholic moral
teaching, the principles of Catholic ecclesiology and the demands of our
pastoral ministry require that this letter speak both to Catholics in a specific
way and to the wider political community regarding public policy. Neither
audience and neither mode of address can be neglected when the issue has
the cosmic dimensions of the nuclear arms race." (The Challenge of Peace,
#19).
Our understanding of our place and posture shapes our perspective. This
perspective includes both the traditional teaching of the Church and the particulars of our present circumstances. In the pastoral letter on war and peace,
the bishops had two basic purposes: helping Catholics form their consciences
on the issues under discussion and contributing to the public policy debate
about the morality of war.
Both dimensions have public relevance. If the Church effectively carries
out its teaching role, assisting in the formation of adult Christian conscience
on matters of war and peace, this will inevitably have an impact on the
public perception of these issues. Questions of the limits and obligations
of citizenship will be sharpened. In a corresponding fashion, the engagement by the Church as an institution in the public policy debate opens space
in the public argument for explicit consideration of the moral dimensions
of policy.
Let me acknowledge that the Catholic bishops in this country have assumed
more of a public role in our society than was done in the past. The Church
has always been active in the public arena not only because of our constitutional freedom to participate but also because of the imperatives of our social
doctrine. Although some might see our more assertive posture in terms of
being a "post-immigrant" church, I would make a case for our activism
based on the extremity of present-day problems. Let me cite two cases.
First, the pastoral letter on war and peace points to the newness of this
moment in human history when we literally have in our hands the power
to destroy life from the face of this earth. The pastoral letter provides a
framework within which we can make a moral analysis of the critical issues
facing us in the nuclear age. Although the pastoral letter recognizes the depth
and seriousness of divisions between the United States and the Soviet Union
on a range of issues, the American bishops were determined that these divisions not divert attention from a central moral and political truth of our
time: if nuclear weapons are used, we all will lose. There will be no victors,
only the vanquished; there will be no calculation of costs and benefits because
the costs will run beyond our ability to calculate.
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Drawing on the same moral vision which supports our teaching on warfare, the Catholic bishops have chosen to be equally visible in our opposition to abortion. The basic moral principle that the direct killing of the
innocent is always wrong is so fundamental that the need to defend it in
the multiple cases of abortion, warfare, and care of the handicapped and
the terminally ill is, we believe, self-evident. That is why one cannot, with
consistency, claim to be truly pro-life if one applies the principle of the sanctity of life to other issues but rejects it in the case of abortion. By the same
token, one cannot, with consistency, claim to be truly pro-life if one applies
the principle to other issues but holds that the direct killing of innocent noncombatants in warfare is morally justified. To fail to stand for this principle
is to make a fundamental error. But the moral principle does not stand alone;
it is related to other dimensions of the Church's social teaching.
The opposition to abortion is rooted in the conviction that civil law and
social policy must always be subject to ongoing moral analysis. Simply
because a civil law is in place does not mean that it should be blindly supported. To encourage reflective, informed assessment of civil law and policy
is to keep alive the capacity for moral criticism in society. In addition, our
position opposing abortion is rooted in our understanding of the role of
the state in society. The state has positive moral responsibilities; it is not
simply a neutral umpire; neither is its role limited to restraining evil. The
responsibilities of the state include both the protection of innocent life from
attack and enhancement of human life at every stage of its development.
The fact of 1.5 million abortions a year in the United States erodes the
moral character of the state; if the civil law can be neutral when innocent
life is under attack, the implications for law and morality in our society
are frightening.
These themes drawn from Catholic theology are not restricted in their
application to the community of faith. These are truths of the moral and
political order which are also fundamental to the Western constitutional
heritage. The opposition to abortion, properly stated, is not a sectarian claim
but a reflective, rational position which any person of good will may be
invited to consider. Examples can be used to illustrate the convergence of
our concerns about abortion with other key social questions in American
society.
The appeal to a higher moral law to reform and refashion existing civil
law was the central idea that Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. brought to the
civil rights movement of the 1960's. The pro-life movement of the 1980's
is based on the same appeal. Pro-life today should be seen as an extension
of the spirit of the civil rights movement. Similarly, the Baby Doe case has
proved to be a meeting ground of principle and practice between civil rights
and pro-life advocates. The common ground is as yet not sufficiently
explored, but there is significant potential for development in this area.
As I conclude this second part of my presentation which dealt with the
Church's role in the development of public policy, I wish to repeat something
I said earlier. I am not suggesting that religious groups should expect or
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be given special treatment regarding their involvement in the public sphere.
We should earn a hearing in the public debate by the quality of our analysis
and the consistency of our argument. I am convinced that the moral dimension of our public life is a topic which people inside and outside religious
communities are concerned about. If we can demonstrate how a moral vision
enriches the choices and the challenges which confront us as a nation, then
consideration will be given to the moral factor in every policy debate.
3. The Role of the Religious Leader in Public Policy Development
From what I have already said, it should be clear that the Catholic bishop's
role in the development of public policy is an extension of his teaching role
in the Church, always within the framework of our Catholic tradition and
in union with the Pope and other bishops. Because of differences in ecclesial
structure, the role of other religious leaders may take a somewhat different
shape.
What I would like to share with you in this third section of my presentation is based on my own experience of the last few years, my experience
as a religious leader engaged in discussions relating to public policy. Three
of my reflections will focus on problem areas and the last will explain the
primary source of my motivation and energies.
One of the problems that religious leaders have to face continually is the
question of credibility. Some people ignore what we say simply because they
perceive us as operating outside our own area of expertise when we make
statements regarding public policy. I am not arguing that we have the
definitive answers to complex questions or that we have the same kind of
competence as foreign policy experts. We do bring a dimension to the discussion that is proper to our competence, however. We merely ask that people
evaluate our arguments on their merits. Members of the American Bar
Association know what it means to get a fair hearing of your case.
A second problem that religious leaders face is our personal limitation
as we attempt to develop the moral dimension of any issue. I am simply
Joseph Bernardin-nothing less, nothing more. I have my own blind spots.
I have my own doubts. At times I lack the courage to set forth my convictions clearly and without hesitation. Sometimes I simply do not know what
to do. Perhaps you have similar experiences in your professional and personal lives.
A key solution is to engage in frequent dialogue with others-with experts
in various fields, with respected colleagues, with trusted advisors. The pastoral
letter on peace and war was conceived and brought to full term in a process
of dialogue. While this was not the first time the bishops have consulted
with others in preparing a pastoral statement, none has involved such an
open, broad, inter-disciplinary exchange. The bishops debated the contents
of the letter in small groups and in general sessions. We collected expert
testimony and suggestions from hundreds of people.
A corollary of this is that our participation in the public policy debate
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does not mean that one person or one church or one scholarly community
or one think tank has all the answers. Through our participation in dialogue
we can share our competencies and God-given personal resources while compensating for our weaknesses and personal limitations. Our collaboration
helps ensure the quality of a moral vision for this nation and makes it both
credible and worthy of implementation.
A third problem that religious leaders have to face when they engage in
public policy development is the pressure that special interest groups bring
to bear on the process. I have great respect for people who commit their
talents and energies to specific projects that impact in significant ways on
public policy discussions. But as a religious leader, I find that I have to
keep within my perspective the whole range of issues that affect the quality
of human life. Although I may focus my personal resources from time to
time on a particular area, it is part of my responsibility as a bishop to keep
all these issues in broader perspective and choose prudently and wisely which
ones to address at a particular time. This task continues to stretch me. At
the same time it can disappoint those who expect a bishop to agree with
them on every idea and strategy or who expect a religious leader to be
available full time for a particular project.
Two of my goals during the past year have been (1) developing the case
for the development of a consistent ethic of life and (2) bringing together
under the umbrella of such an ethic individuals and groups who are focusing their energies on a particular area of moral concern. Whether or not
I will be successful with regard to the second goal remains to be seen.
With regard to the consistent ethic of life, I am arguing for linking such
moral issues as genetics, abortion, capital punishment, modern warfare and
the care of terminally ill. Admittedly, these are all distinct problems, enormously complicated, and deserving individual treatment. No single answer
and no simple response will solve them.
The purpose of proposing a consistent ethic of life is to argue that success on any one of the issues threatening life requires a concern for the
broader attitude in society about respect for human life. Attitude is the place
to root an ethic of life. Change of attitude in turn can lead to change of
policies and practices in our society.
These are three problems that religious leaders face in my experience, and
I have indicated how I am going about resolving these in my own life and
ministry.
MARTIN

E.

MARTY*

A generation ago the Protestant member of a Protestant-Catholic-Jewish
panel who had just heard the Catholic would be expected to speak up for
his own communions in criticism of the Catholic. Today the calling and
assignment of participants has changed. In any case, my response would
* Fairfax M. Cone Distinguished Service Professor, University of Chicago Divinity School;
Associate Editor of The Christian Century. Mr Martin E. Marty is also an ordained Lutheran
minister. At the author's request, the text of his response to Cardinal Bernardin appears in
its completely unedited form.
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be brief were I only to affirm or criticize what was said. One "Amen!"
would take care of that.**
There are other things one can do by way of response, however, since
Cardinal Bernardin in his short address raised more issues than he could
resolve. I should like to report on what I heard that can be placed on the
agenda for further discussion and inquiry. The themes with which he dealt
are fresh and even urgent. We need many angles of vision. Today the conflict, then, is not over, but there are new lines. One kind of Protestant,
Catholic, and Jew will line up with others of their kind-over against another
partisan who is Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish. On another issue, the
alliances, which are fluid and fragile in any case, may draw different people
across different lines. We shall use the fluidity and fragility as something
to be welcomed, not disdained. Let me respond with five uncertain or linedrawing "whethers.... .
L

On Whether Church-State Represents a
Settled Area of National Life or Not

The Cardinal quickens in us all a sense of the ways in which church and
state issues are alive, provoking, promising. The DePaul center will not soon
work itself out of a job or have to deal only with history. Each new event
or constellation seems to disinter other aspects of the founding fathers' proposals. Each test forces a rethinking of what seemed settled. We may even
wonder whether "church" and "state," the European ways of putting things
serve us in pluralist republic-an America. Madison spoke of the line of separation between the rights of religion and of civil authority.
Whoever reads the newspapers in this election season knows what readings
of court decisions these years past should have suggested: everything seems
up for grabs. Alfred North Whitehead has said that a clash of doctrines
is an opportunity, not a disaster. Since the clash now in this season is not
only one of doctrines but of persons, parties, and causes, we have to wallow
in opportunity, sometimes asking or wishing for less of it.
We may not like the form it takes; here, again, one calls in Whitehead:
"Great ideas enter into reality with evil associates and disgusting alliances.
But the greatness remains,...." In any case, the American experiment
in religious freedom with its assurances of rights on both and all sides of
lines is providing us with what John Courtney Murray called, against the
threat of barbarians and the chance of confusion, a "civil argument" based
on a minimum of consensus and, he hoped, one hopes, the kind of disagreement out of which argument and perhaps some agreements can grow.
I.

On Whether Religious Leaders and Groups Have
A Right to Speak Up on Public Issues or Not

Cardinal Bernardin, nationally known for advocating the right to speak
up, has done so again in this presentation, with personal engagement and
** I reserve the right to disagree some other day.
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eloquence. He knows that the "right" is not the only issue: there is often
the question of whether such speaking up is good policy for churches and
civil agents, and he knows the need for discretion in a pluralist society. Yet
good policy and manners are not at issue. Rights are, when the press and
the people often suggest that such speaking up violates rights, intrudes across
"the wall of separation."
The current conflicts are forcing a rereading of the founders, an assessment of their intentions so far as these are explicit or deducible. There is
no doubt that Madison has credentials that make him eminently worth listening to. He was among the more rigorous restricters of the churches when
it came to presumed intrusions across the line he and his colleagues drew.
Yet he was in favor of what Paul Weber has called "equal separation" of
church and state. That meant just as civil authority could not establish or
give privilege to churches or religion, it also had to assure that there be,
all things being equal, no disability against individuals or groups who spoke
up in public life, simply because they were religious. They had to have the
same rights as other agents and agencies.
That right is often threatened, if not by law, then at least in opinion and
rhetoric. Some citizens thoughtless or momentarily unthinking ones, it seems
to me, try to suggest that such disability should and does exist. Were it
to lay claim on American thought and rights, this would mean either that
only the non-believing five percent dare be elected to office or dare speak
up in public life or that citizens have to park their religion at home or in
chapel, far from rostrum or campaign or legislature. The cardinal here often
shows how people draw on their deepest resources and centers of value, and
that these will usually be religious. To draw on them is not to settle everything
or much of anything, but it does assure that whole persons are speaking
and acting, within their rights and, in the main, for the good of the republic.
IH. On Whether, When an Issue Is Urgent, Religious Leaders and
Groups Are Well Counselled To Remain Silent and Uninvolved
The Cardinal knows as anyone of good sense might that religious people
need not and should not speak up on all issues. The Protestant right loses
some credibility when it treats the Panama Canal treaty or the prolonged
existence of the Department of Education as ultimate concerns. It is possible
to cry wolf too often, to wear out welcomes, to lead a public to have no
scale with which to measure significances. Yet there are times and seasons
and issues which call forth the moral counsel of those formed and informed
by religion and responsible for leadership in it. Whenever I hear Cardinal
Bernardin choosing his moments and causes I think of an adage: "not to
take a stand is to take a stand." On gross, even epochal issues, the churches
and Christians of Nazi Germany were counted upon by Hitler and were
reckoned in his camp.
In the freedom and complexity of the American republic speaking up rarely
means representing a bloc of voters, though interests of a church, like those
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of anything else that Madison called a "faction," have their legitimate place.
Instead, the religious leader is constantly involved in the open and critical
field of convoking respondents, not merely representing them. Madison made
much of the need to affect opinion out of which action grew, not merely
to render rigid the boundaries around factions.
IV. On Whether Religious Leaders Should Take
the Risk In an Era Where Persuasion, Not Coercion Rules
From the third "whether" it is clear that in a republic religious leaders
have to convince each other, themselves, and their followers, if there is to
be support. Blind following, over the long span, is unlikely, rare, and
unproductive. Thus, as one sister put it, those who make abortion illegal
must first put energies into reasoning across the blocs to make it unthinkable.
There are risks in such ventures: risks of division in the ranks, of misrepresentation and confusion, of stimulating anticlericalism, of causing some to be
confused and others to be joyless about the Gospel itself because they
repudiate the package in which it seems to be coming.
What the Cardinal knows-which is why he appears in forums such as
this-is that when the churches do speak up and act, they do lose some
of their shield and protection in society. People who are deferential about
the sacredness of the churches' message and symbols give them no quarter
in the open fray of politics. Church leaders should not be surprised about
this; they are no more generous to each other in controversy. They have
to know that politics is not the Gospel; it does not save souls or make sad
hearts glad. It is a modest art or science designed to minimize the violence
inherent in history and to assure the components of society some measure
of power proportionate to their weight and scope in society. Churches which
enter politics will counter counterorganized factions, and they have to know it.
What if church leaders and groups disagree with each other, as they
manifestly do these years, this year-when the debate is more within religion
than between the religious and the secular? I would argue that we are still
better off than where there is no risk-taking at all. We are closer to realism
and reality, exposing the deeper sources of valuation and action. We can
call both sides, all sides, to be accountable on some theological terms or
other. We can force them to seek what John Courtney Murray called higher
levels of generality, in ethics or metaphysics or theology, so that there can
be argument. They will often fail to reach these levels, but even the process
has validity.
V. On Whether Religious Leaders Are Religious
or Whether They Lead Religious Groups
I bring this up because any content analysis of the Archbishop of Chicago's
speeches and writings or any time-and-motion study suggests to us who are
not of his flock that he conceives his task first to be one of spiritual leadership. That should be taken for granted, but it dare not be, given past per-
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formances on the American scene. The last thing evident to one who would
use phenomenological methods and bracket assumptions, in other words,
to any intuitive and honest reporter who feels things in his or her bones,
the last thing the public perceives this year's clergy-in-politics to be is spiritual.
The prayers we have been hearing are fawning, the spirit is often greedy
and grabby, the representation is boastful and rude. Such advocacy is of
short term and little value. Here one must listen again to Peguy: "Everything
begins in mysticism and ends in politics"--and then turn everything back,
recycling it through "mysticism," a code name here for the life of prayer.
In our mainline Protestant tradition we learned "back in the sixties" how
short term is any effort to live off the spiritual capital in which earlier generations invested. When the church in the public order lives off that capital
without reinvesting, it soon runs out. The treasure of the church is the lived
life of prayer, response to the word, spirituality, nurture, and each generation and agent must contribute to it. When church-in-politics is seen as
bureaucracy and taskforce, as unrepresented and unrepresentative of Word
or God's people, it soon is seen as an agent of bad faith and loses power.
For that reason I was cheered to hear the Cardinal at an ABA showcase
speaking for the prayerful roots of public action among believers. This can
be done in a way that combines a sense of the sacred with a tinge of humor,
irony, and perspective on one's self-but it must be done, in the nature
of the case and if there is to be power.
In other words, the religious leader has to be religious if there is to be
long-term and profound leadership. It would be ill-mannered and theologically
not apt for the Cardinal to claim for himself what he calls for, just as it
would be less than collegial for those of us who have benefited from his
mien and acts not to recognize his distinctive and persistent role.
HONORABLE ARLIN

M.

ADAMS*

It is a great honor for me to speak with you today on the role of the
religious leader in the development of social policy. I approach the task with
considerable diffidence, for I am neither a religious leader, nor a scholar
of religion. I have had the privilege, though, of filling a number of positions in public and political life which may bear on my assignment. Of particular relevance to the topic we address today, I believe, is the four years
I served as Secretary of Public Welfare for Pennsylvania and the fifteen
years I served as a judge on the United States Court of Appeals.
I should like first to utilize the position of the judge as a way of
approaching today's topic and then, toward the end of my remarks, make
reference to my tenure as welfare secretary .
As a judge, it is my responsibility to hear the many controversies litigants
bring to our courts for resolution. The most important of these disputes
implicate constitutional questions. Judges grow cautious as they approach
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.

1984]

RELIGIOUS LEADER AND PUBLIC POLICY

15

these issues for, in settling such matters, they must decide what the most
fundamental document of our legal system means for a particular social controversy. That kind of decision is inherently different from settling a contract dispute between commercial parties or a boundary contest between
disgruntled neighbors.
The rules governing the resolution of constitutional questions are quite
strict. Judges may not reach out to resolve these issues; rather, they must
be inextricably emobodied in the dispute the litigants have brought to court.'
And if there is some other way to decide the matter-statutory construction
or legal custom, for instance-judges must use that other way to avoid dealing
with the constitutional question.2
A host of stringent rules also limits the parties who may properly raise
constitutional matters3 and the occasions on which these matters may be
adjudicated.' Should a litigant satisfy these strict criteria and should the case
be ripe for decision, the judge must still approach the constitutional issue
in a guarded fashion. Our jurisdiction-the authority which legitimizes the
judge's decision in a case-is extremely confined when it comes to making
a constitutional pronouncement. By deep-rooted tradition, judges must tailor
their constitutional conclusions as closely as possible to the facts of the controversy. If a legal precedent fits those facts, it must normally be used. Broad
constructions of the Constitution's language must be avoided if narrower
readings will suffice.'
I have devoted this time to describing the position of the constitutional
jurist because I believe that, in many respects, it is the inverse or the mirror
image of the role of the religious leader in the developement of social policy.
Judges must speak to the particular facts of the actual controversy before
them, while religious leaders, in my view, should avoid, except in unusual
circumstances, putting the weight of their moral authority behind particular
solutions to social problems. Judges should be reticent to declare fundamental

1. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94 (1968); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 509 (1961)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (both cases stating that federal courts are barred from deciding
"abstract, hypothetical, or contingent questions"); U.S. CONST. art. 111, § 2 (case or controversy
requirement); see also Princeton Univ. v. Schmid, 455 U.S. 100 (1982) (federal courts do not
decide hypothetical issues nor give advisory opinions).
2. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 306-07 (1980); see also Spector Motor Serv.,
Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944) (federal courts should withhold judgment on
questions of constitutionality unless unavoidable).
3. See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976) (standing doctrine). Generally, constitutional rights are personal and may not be asserted vicariously. Broadrick
v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610 (1973); see also Note, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus
Tertii, 88 HARV. L. REv. 423, 429-30 (1974) (assertion of a third party's constitutional rights
or injury will not confer jurisdiction).
4. See Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm.,
461 U.S. 190, 200 (1983) (ripeness); North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971) (mootness
doctrine).

5. See generally A.

BICKEL,

THE LEAST DANGERoUs

BRANCH

importance of judicial restraint in constitutional adjudication).

(1962) (emphasizing the
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law, whereas the mission of the religious leader is to remind us constantly
of the existence and meaning of transcendent principles in our daily lives.
Before I proceed, let me make some disclaimers. Note that I am not
addressing my remarks to the religious leader's right to speak out on particular questions troubling the political community. The religious leader has
as much right in the constitutional sense to address burning social questions
as does any other citizen. But today we are considering the role of the
religious leader in developing social policy as a religious leader, and not as
a citizen. I am also not suggesting that it is never appropriate for religious
leaders to argue for or against particular social programs and policies,
although I will maintain, for reasons to be developed later, that their direct
involvement in political affairs should be limited and infrequent. Finally,
I do not believe that I am restricting religious leaders to uttering harmless
banalities and pious generalizations when I admonish against certain types
of involvement in political affairs.
I believe that, in approaching particular public policies, the religious leader
must be as reluctant as the judge in approaching constitutional questions
and that this wariness makes good sense both politically and theologically.
Consider the extraordinary case. What would happen if a leader of one
of our principal religions had taken a strong stand on the admission of China
to the United Nations, on the proposed treaty relinquishing title to the
Panama Canal, or on the host of other policy issues that have captured
our political attention in the last decade? By placing his moral and institutional authority behind particular formulations for resolving many political
questions, the religious leader would run the risk of transforming the
institution he represents into a sect, or in Madisonian political terms, a
faction.' A fusion of religious authority and partisan politics can lead to
a sectarian society, as other religious groups find it necessary to defend conflicting policies they find inherent in their own theological views.
The picture I have just sketched of inordinate religious partisanship also
has troubling theological implications. The various religious traditions and
institutions that have contributed to the American civilization are based on
the notion of transcendence, on the view that the spirit is more than the
temporary present. The religious leader must be aware of the threat to this
institutional claim to transcendence latent in the use of religious authority
to promote particular political policies.
Our religious institutions are so valuable to us politically because they stand
above the state, not against it and certainly not with it. The religious leader
cannot hold out a transcendent standard by which the state and its policies
are to be judged if religious authority becomes narrowly political or too
frequently invoked. Indeed, this theological problem might even reemerge as
a political danger. As our religious institutions substitute particular political
6. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison); see also Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering
the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1022 n.16 (1984) (referring to a religious sect degenerating
into a political faction).
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agendas for the universalistic message that is their tradition, the possibility
arises that the state or a party might seek to transform a religious institution into its own instrument.
My views on the religious leader and the development of social policy
have so far been expressed in the language of politics and theology. Even
though I have only some experience in the one, and none in the other, I
hope that I have not wearied you with my dull words or my pretentions.
I am going to take advantage of your patience because I must unfortunately
belabor you with a few philosophical considerations before I can provide
a full picture of my view on today's topic.
To discerfi the proper role of the religious leader in seeking answers to
social questions, I believe we must talk for a few moments about a virtue
first described by Aristotle7 and later made part of our religious tradition
by Thomas Aquinas.' That virtue is prudence. The original meaning of this
ideal is only partially captured by the typical use of that word today. When
we call someone prudent, we are usually praising that person's careful, considered judgment. But to classical thought and Thomistic etiology, prudence
meant more than cautious or even thoughtful conduct.
Prudence for the philosopher is a type of wisdom, and there is a different prudence for each of those things about which we may hope to become
wise. Thus, the prudent physician is wise about medicine; his judgment is
weighty because it rests on a practical knowledge of medical matters acquired
only after theoretical study has been fused with years of experience. Prudence,
however, is not the exclusive preserve of the formally trained. Some may
be wise in a particular endeavor almost as if by nature or by divine blessing. In whatever way it is acquired, prudence in this view of life is necessary
before one can truly master a human art. Politics is such an art, I believe,
and to be a wise politician, a steward of the commonweal, one must have
the virtue of political prudence. A good politician is like a good physician,
a good lawyer, or a good artisan. He must understand his craft, however
abstractly or concretely, before he can practice with skill.
There is, to be sure, a prudence associated with religious leadership, and
that is, I suppose, what we are ultimately called upon to discuss today. We
are not interested in just any religious leader. Rather, our focus is on the
wise religious leader, the one who is blessed with the prudence necessary
to lead a congregation or an institution in this perilous world. I believe that
the wise religious leader would recognize that his prudence is not necessarily
the sort of wisdom on which a good politician or leader of state will rely.
The religious leader will not necessarily have the special wisdom necessary
to mold out of political realities a world that is a little more free, or a little
more prosperous, or a little more secure.
If we assume that there is no difference between political and religious
prudence, we run the same risk involved in our one-time enchantment with
7. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHics bk. 6 (rev. ed. 1934) (practical wisdom).
8. 1 T. AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Question 1, articles 4-6 (1964).
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science. We were so taken by the wondrous insights of the experimenter
that we thought we could transform the political realm, and human nature
itself, by the simple application of scientific principles to earthly affairs. 9
The result has been, at least in the nightmares of our story writers,'" a
technocratic society in which a politicized science eradicates all spontaneity
and freedom. Those nightmares are founded on our philosophical and cultural
common sense: There is a danger inherent in mistaking a wisdom appropriate
in one field as a set of principles that should govern another."
If religious wisdom were transferred directly to the political domain, I
fear the same kind of untoward consequences. Our literature may not be
replete with the nightmare of theological politics, but the literature of other
societies provides a simple moral: It is as much a mistake to abjure political
responsibility in the face of religious authority as it is for religious institutions to surrender their independence before the temporal authority of the
state.
But surely there must come a point, you might suggest, when religious
leaders are duty bound to speak out emphatically and with the full force
of their moral power against the evil we inflict on each other. There can
be no doubt of that, but how many such occasions are there? I can think
of only a few possible candidates in my lifetime, and I doubt that we could
all agree on a list of three or four without acrimonious argument. Such debate
would be unavailing in my view, for if religious leaders wait to speak out
on social affairs until they are confronted by some cataclysmic evil, they
have already abdicated their social responsibility. Politics is, at base, a struggle
over how society should be structured. Politics is our collective life. Surely
our religions have much to teach us about how our everyday life should
be ordered.
By now I fear that I have you hopelessly confused. Or perhaps you feel
pity for the judge talking above his head about politics, theology, and
philosophy. If I think it is unwise for religious leaders, except in unusual
circumstances, to adopt particular political positions, have I not condemned
these leader to simplistic platitudes and utopian visions? I have two reasons
for believing that this criticism misses the mark.
The criticism would be correct only if the message of our religious traditions contains nothing more than virtuous hopes. To say that a wise religious
leader would not normally identify his institution with a particular social
policy is not to restrict the vitality of the powerful social vision underlying
our religions. They call out for a just and holy world. As a judge, I have
9. The possibility of reducing the political process to a mathematical formula or predicting social policy from a sum of private factors is discussed in A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM
THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 12-13 (1960).
10. See, e.g., A. BURGESS, A CLOCKWORK ORANGE (1962) (deprived of their capacity for
moral choice by science, people become a "clockwork orange,"-something mechanical that
appears organic).
11.See J. HABERMAS, Technology and Science as "Ideology," in TOWARD A RATIONAL SOCIETY
81 (1970).
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often felt, and been influenced by, the power of that vision, but only rarely,
if ever, have I found that a litigant's arguments completely embody the moral
and religious virtues I subscribe to.
Legal and political controversies are never that simple; they invariably
involve conflicting interests, each with a certain claim on one's sense of justice
and fairness. If they were not complex, they never would have reached the
courts: They would have been resolved long before the lawyers were called
in. In settling these disputes, we seek to fashion a solution that maximizes
the good that is latent in the conflict.
Sometimes judges will see the matter somewhat differently than I; they
will favor one interest a little more than another or devise a solution that
seems more expedient or less disruptive than the one I proposed. When I
disagree with my colleagues about a decision, I would not assert that my
view partakes of a transcendent moral legitimacy, and I would be quite surprised if my interlocutor were to claim this support for himself. That is not
to say that religion does not speak directly to knotty social problems, but
rather that it speaks in its own way.
Anyone who has ever had to settle a dispute between people whose actions
injure each other knows the value of piety. Without a sense of the message
underlying our religious culture, without an appreciation of the fact that
political ideologies only imperfectly reflect the good and bad to be found
in this life, and without an awareness of personal inadequacy before our
ideals, a judge in settling disputes will eventually confuse justice with what
in the end remains, legally and morally speaking, a set of personal
preferences.
There is another reason for the belief that religious leaders, in avoiding
direct political involvement, can do more than utter uplifting generalities.
Religious leaders have a duty to see that their congregations and society itself
are politically informed. If they offer us simple homilies, they have avoided
that responsibility.
Religious leaders, as a matter of moral conviction, should insist that the
issues of our day be discussed publicly. They should insist that we not shrink
from our moral responsibilities out of political expediency. They should insist
that the ethical presuppositions of competing policies be critically examined.
To fulfill these duties, religious leaders must provide the means and the
occasion by which their congregants can become knowledgeable about pressing
social concerns and engage in public debate. Above all, they should not stifle
discussion and the development of a just social policy by endorsing a particular view or a particular solution as the theologically correct approach.
The latter position, I believe, is politically dangerous and theologically unwise.
I mentioned that I would return to the other public post I have been
privileged to occupy-Secretary of Public Welfare. Few things in my life
have given me more pause than that office, for I had to shoulder a personal
responsibility for the aged, the mentally infirm, the unemployed, the blind,
the deaf, and all the many others who sometimes need help to maintain
basic human dignity.
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During my tenure as Secretary, I met many religious leaders who embodied
the wisdom I have called religious prudence. They had no difficulty in finding
a social message in their religious vision. They did not speak in vague
platitudes, but in terms of concrete proposals. We discussed, disagreed,
cooperated, and sometimes compromised. Not once did we believe that the
other's point of view was morally repugnant or religiously defective, for we
all knew that we were trying to forge difficult solutions to perhaps intractable problems.
The religious leaders I dealt with in my capacity as Secretary took public
stands on some very particularized questions of general concern. They had
firm views on how portions of the state's educational budget should be
allocated; they lobbied effectively on the use of state funds to help religiously
affiliated hospitals and mental institutions. They knew where they stood on
a host of social issues, but they did not bring their proposals to me solely
as religious leaders. Rather they acted as representatives of agencies pursuing the common good. They acted with both political as well as with religious
prudence, and recognized, that the general welfare is a composite of many
private needs and social visions. They were able to advance their positions
effectively because they knew that their views had to compete with many
other equally legitimate views. In our councils, they were able to marshal
facts, present arguments, demonstrate fiscal responsibility and the capacity
to keep a pledge. They were able to recognize other positions and to
compromise. I2
That kind of compromise was legitimate because these religious leaders
were, in effect, political actors representing social programs they knew only
inadequately reflected the ideal. Had a matter of religious principle been
at stake, compromise would have been much more questionable; perhaps
even unacceptable. Had these religious leaders pressed their programs as the
good and the just, their interests could not have been served unless the ideas
of other well-motivated and politically astute citizens were ignored. Their
programs were respected because these leaders could make their case in
political terms to public officials seeking to allocate scarce resources most
efficiently. An appeal to religious authority to justify a particular program
in those circumstances would have been inappropriate and unavailing.
This, then, is my view of the role of religious leaders in the development
of public policy. Those leaders should zealously guard the independence of
their own institution. They are not the state and should avoid dangerous
entanglements with the state. They should eschew elected political office or
high appointed posts because in accepting these positions they run the risk
of identifying themselves and their institutions with public power.
On the other hand, religious leaders have some responsibility to speak
12. The activity of these religious leaders was completely consonant with the teaching of

the noted Catholic philosopher, Jacques Maritain, that "civil legislation should adapt itself
to the variety of moral creeds of the diverse spiritual lineages which essentially bear on the
common good of the social body ..
" J. MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE 169 (1951).
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out strongly against serious evils and to do much more. They must inform
public debate so that we can avoid catastrophe, but in doing so they must
recognize that they will frequently become political actors who must compete under secular rules. When they enter the political sphere, they must
recognize that their vision is one of many. Insofar as that vision becomes
politically specific, it loses the transcendent authority that may bring it closer
to the truth in another sphere.
Religious institutions in our tradition are morally bound to engage the
social world. Politics is a major component of that world, but it is not its
totality. Our religious leaders must constantly remind us that there is more
than mere political imperative and momentary expediency. As they become
more particularized in their proposals, they should become more and more
wary because they too can succumb to the temptations to which politicians
often fall. They can come to identify the good with themselves and a. particular program of social reform with justice itself. In that course lies great
danger both to politics and to religion.
Our political culture has inspired great wonder and respect because our
Constitution separates religion and the state. Too often we concentrate on
one element of that separation; on the fact that the state cannot constitutionally foster particular religions. Commentators as far back as de
Toqueville, however, have emphasized the second element: The state may
not hinder free expression of legitimate religious belief.' 3
Those who are inspired by religion are bound to be political actors in
many respects. Religious leaders must strive to help the members of their
flock fulfill their civil duties. At the same time, these leaders must strive
to preserve the autonomy of religious institutions.
In this great nation we have usually recognized that religion, the state,
and society are not one and the same. If either religion or the state becomes
completely identified with society, then our religious and civil culture will
suffer.
The real political glory of our nation, I believe, lies in the fact that we
refuse to conflate institutions that must stay separate in order to remain vital.
13. A.
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